Bribery, to circumvent the law
Corruption is the daily contact between officials and citizens are generally bribery of officials in order to violate the laws and regulations. Household studies postkomunistiskajās individual countries show that the charges the police, especially traffic police, and charges for health services at almost half of all spending bribes. The bribe-related educational institutions, especially in this system at higher levels, are also relatively izplatīti.7 bribery is often found a secret, and sometimes "lists" to be published. Ukrainian city Donetsk newspaper reported - kukuļa high price for the benefit of an exam marker of local high schools and universities, indicates the "group" on the price only for each student, plus an additional rate for those students who have to keep the exam but not all izkrituši.8 bribe is so systematized. Frequently individual officials or residents is required or bribe without a fixed rate.
Where some people offering bribes, for example, highway police, it is politically less damaging than the cases in which state officials engaged in an organized population displacement. If any driver bribe policemen road, it implicitly poses a threat to road safety, but if the police team takes bribes for issuing drivers' licenses, it is systematically undermined by both the public safety and law vara.9 The political damage is even greater when the kukuļņemšanu has been institutionalized as if a public authority's staff are squeezed together bribes and distributes them among themselves, often based on a refined formulu.10 If this happens, the official regulatory laws are in fact changed, and in the office or branch has established a new political regime. If public institutions begin to dominate the informal rules and payments, has changed the country's political machine.
If corruption is affecting only some of the regulatory sector, the political damage is dependent on who they have on the sector. It is one thing, when people buy in public services like health care or higher education. State legitimacy and efficiency and is more seriously jeopardized if the courts are venal processes and court judgments, so that justice is a central element of democracy, and its disruption affects the level of public accountability in all government and public spheres of life. Corruption in tax collection service, probably located somewhere in the middle of the political damage to the dial, while the bribe money for building, fire and sanitation inspectors can cause great harm to society if they result in a compromised security. However, in some cases, corruption do not produce any harmful effects to public safety, and it rather is a way of avoiding excessive red tape.
Realign-, concealing and disorganization
Bureaucrats who share extortion by knowingly makes a confusing and increases the law, procedures, rules and fee payment requirement, in order to compel more companies to offer kukuļus.11 Such officials may also shorten the office working hours, withholding information and making possible neciešamāku the bureaucratic process, as thus creates more barriers to the possibility that people will offer illegal payments. Suzana Rouza-Ekermane (Susan Rose-Ackerman) indicates that bureaucrats trying to behave as a monopoly, all of which benefit from a deficit-induced up cenām.12 Or, speaking Klitgārda (Robert Klitgaard) words, "corruption thrives on disruption." Chaos and confusion 13 is also guaranteed by the shield, behind which to hide, if investigations by the well-know bureaucrats who are reluctant to use his position enrichment purposes. In turn, the population is in the interest of ensuring effective public administration and its demonopolization.
Realign-corruption may exist because of the bureaucrats, who made himself a very important, because they have no power gain psychological satisfaction. Various reasons given, it is also involved in the group of officials who have an interest in discouraging reformed the bureaucracy reduction. If such a person wins, the fight for influence and steely procedures become the post of national regulatory systems characteristic.
Licensing and Inspection office dastardly Use
Each State shall issue an occupational license and permit activities that affect the common good, such as public safety or environmental protection. Licensing is always vulnerable to corruption, especially if the systems set up instead of appearing, as has happened postkomunistiskajās countries.
Study of Corruption in Ukraine 1999. was found that the average operator in their business registration was required for the fifty-five days. Twenty-six offices had the right to inspect the company and request a fine of violation of law, but the rules were not published, and the inspectors were able to punish the operators, saying about a violation. In such a situation may contribute to bribe a license and avoidance sodanaudām.14
Some inspectors are greedy. Eighty-seven percent of Russian entrepreneurs in a 1997 to 1998. On trial, officials reported on the pressure, particularly requests for bribes when they tried to obtain a license and atļaujas.15 comparative study of the shop owners in Russia and Poland found that the shop owners in Moscow examined an average of 3.9 different offices, who visited the shops together nineteen times per year . Shop owners in Warsaw examined an average of 2.6 offices, which officials arrived in the shop, only nine times gadā.16

References
1. For example, William L. Miller, B. ase Grodeland, and Tatyana Y. Koshechkina, A Culture of Corruption? Coping with Government in Post-Communist Europe (New York: Central European University Press, 2001) and several World Bank studies, particularly in Anticorruption in Transition: A Contribution to the Policy Debate (Washington, DC: World Bank, 2000).
2. Transparency International's data, as well as the former Soviet Union and Eastern European studies show large differences across countries. Cf., For example, Miller et al., Culture of Corruption? and World Bank studies.
3. Robert Klitgaard, Controlling Corruption (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988), 75. p..
4. James C. Scott, Comparative Political Corruption (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1972), 2.lpp.
5. Richard Rose, William Mishler, and Christian Haerpfer, Democracy and Its Alternatives: Understanding Postcommunism Societies (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1998), 188. p..
6. Miller et al., Culture of Corruption? 64-64. p..
7. World Bank, Anticorruption in Transition, 9. p..
8. Miller et al., Culture of Corruption? 100-101. p..
9. Study in Latvia 78 per cent of respondents claimed that "the current bureaucratic system of government forces people to give bribes." Society of openness - Delna, Face of Corruption in Latvia (April 2000)., P.20.
10. Here the EU is based on personal communication with colleagues in the region. There is little systematic study of institutionalized corruption, an organizational aspect. A similar phenomenon and the lack of research in China Ksiaobo min Lu, Cadres and Corruption: The Organizational Involution of the Chinese Communist Party (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2000), 201-202. p..
11. Cf. Vadim Radaev, "Corruption and Violence in Russian Business in the Late 1990s," from the Economic Crime in Russia, ed. Alena V. Ledeneva and Marina Kurkchiyan (Boston: Kluwer Law International, 2000), 66. p.., 12. Susan Rose-Ackerman, Corruption: A Study in Political Economy (New York: Academic Press, 1978), 90. p..
13. Klitgaard, Controlling Corruption, 79. p..
14. Inna Pidluska, Ukrainian Center for Independent Research, reported Robert Lyle, "Ukraine Under Spotlight Corruption," RFE / RL Newsline (February 26, 1999).
15. Radaev, "Corruption and Violence in Russian Business," 67-68. p..
16. Timothy Frye, "Corruption: The Polish and Russian Experiences," Electronic Journal of the U.S. Information Agency, Economic Perspectives 3, no. 5 (November 1998): 2. p..